MARC details
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05956nam a2200277 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
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th563 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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ISI Library, Kolkata |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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20241001144845.0 |
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230816b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
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ISI Library |
| Language of cataloging |
English |
| 082 04 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
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| Edition number |
23 |
| Classification number |
302.13 |
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K18 |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
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| Personal name |
Karmokar, Madhuparna |
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author |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Essays on evaluation qggregation, strategy-proof social choice, and myopic-farsighted ftable matching/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc |
Madhuparna Karmokar |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
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| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Kolkata: |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
Indian Statistical Institute, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc |
2022 |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
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| Extent |
160 pages, |
| 502 ## - DISSERTATION NOTE |
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| Dissertation note |
Thesis (Ph.D.) -Indian Statistical Institute, 2022 |
| 504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
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| Bibliography, etc |
Includes references |
| 505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
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| Formatted contents note |
On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules -- A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group<br/>strategy-proofness -- Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwisemajority decisions on path-connected domains -- Strategy-proof Random Voting Rules on Weak Domains -- The Structure of (Local) Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Random Rule -- Myopic-farsighted stability in many-to-one matching |
| 508 ## - CREATION/PRODUCTION CREDITS NOTE |
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| Creation/production credits note |
Guided by Prof. Souvik Roy |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
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| Summary, etc |
The thesis comprises of six chapters on evaluation aggregation, social choice and matching. A brief<br/>introduction to each of the six chapters is provided below.<br/>In Chapter 2, we consider collective evaluation problems, where individual grades given to candidates<br/>are combined to obtain a collective grade for each of these candidates. In this paper, we prove the<br/>following two results: (i) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and continuous if and only if it<br/>is a min-max rule, and (ii) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and consistent if and only if it is<br/>an extreme min-max rule.<br/>Chapters 3,4 and 5 deals with strategic social choice problems where a social planner needs to decide<br/>an outcome for a society from a finite set of feasible outcomes based on the preferences of the agents in<br/>the society. Agents preferences are their private information and agents are strategic meaning that they<br/>manipulate the outcome by misreporting their preferences whenever that is beneficial for them. The<br/>objective of the social planner is to design a rule that no agent can manipulate.<br/>In Chapter 3, we consider domains that satisfy pervasiveness and top-connectedness, and we provide a<br/>necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-dictatorial, Pareto optimal, and group strategy-proof choice rules on those domains.<br/>In Chapter 4, we consider choice functions that are unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof and consider domains that are single-peaked on some tree. We prove the following three<br/>results in this setting. First, there exists a unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof<br/>choice function on a path-connected domain if and only if the domain is single-peaked on a tree and the<br/>number of agents is odd. Second, a choice function is unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group<br/>strategy-proof on a single-peaked domain on a tree if and only if it is the pairwise majority rule (also<br/>known as the tree-median rule) and the number of agents is odd. Third, there exists a unanimous,<br/>anonymous, symmetric, and strategy-proof choice function on a strongly path-connected domain if and<br/>only if the domain is single-peaked on a tree and the number of agents is odd. As a corollary of these<br/>results, we obtain that there exists no unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof<br/>choice function on a path-connected domain if the number of agents is even.<br/>In Chapter 5, we consider weak domains, that is, set of preferences that may admit indifference. We<br/>show that every unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice function on any weak domain<br/>containing all strict preferences is weak random dictatorial. On weak single-peaked domains, we show<br/>that a random social choice function is Pareto optimal and strategy-proof if and only if it is an extreme<br/>probabilistic fixed ballot rule. Next, we consider single-plateaued domains and provide the structure of<br/>unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions on these domains.<br/>Chapter 6 considers the problem of designing strategy-proof social choice rules in an incomplete<br/>information framework. More formally, agents have beliefs about the preferences of the other agents and<br/>they tend to manipulate whenever that improves the expected outcome according to their belief. We<br/>explore the structure of locally ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (LOBIC) random Bayesian rules<br/>(RBRs). We show that under lower contour monotonicity, for almost all prior profiles (with full Lebesgue<br/>measure), a LOBIC RBR is locally dominant strategy incentive compatible (LDSIC). We further show<br/>that for almost all prior profiles, a unanimous and LOBIC RBR on the unrestricted domain is random<br/>dictatorial, and thereby extend the result in [40] for Bayesian rules. Next, we provide a sufficient condition<br/>on a domain so that for almost all prior profiles, unanimous RBRs on it are tops-only. Finally, we provide<br/>a wide range of applications of our results on single-peaked (on arbitrary graphs), hybrid, multiple<br/>single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing, multi-dimensional separable domains, and domains under<br/>partitioning. Since OBIC implies LOBIC by definition, all our results hold for OBIC RBRs.<br/>Chapter 7 considers the many-to-one two-sided matching problem. Agents are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to their ability to foresee the consequences of a block, and thereby categorized as myopic and farsighted. We study the structure of stable matchings and stable sets in this setting |
| 650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Social Science |
| 650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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Social Choice |
| 650 #4 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
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| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Myopic-Farsighted Stable Matching |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
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| Link text |
Full text |
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
<a href="http://dspace.isical.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/10263/7470">http://dspace.isical.ac.in:8080/jspui/handle/10263/7470</a> |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
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Dewey Decimal Classification |
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THESIS |
