Repeated games / Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

1. Basic results on normal-form games;
2. Basic results on extensive-form games;
3. The beliefs space;
4. General model of repeated games;
5. Recursive games;
6. Incomplete information on two sides;
7. Stochastic games;
8. Extensions and further results;
9. Non-zero-sum games with incomplete information;
Appendices;
Author index;
Subject index.

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of repeated games. Starting with the basic results of normal form games, the authors move on to review the main properties of repeated games, covering supergames, games with incomplete information, and stochastic games. The final section discusses new advances in areas such as incomplete information games with signals and stochastic games with lack of information, and non zero-sum games with incomplete information including communication devices and equilibria.