Primer on auction design, management, and strategy / David J. Salant.
Material type:
TextPublication details: Cambridge : MIT Press, ©2014.Description: xiv, 184 pages ; 24 cmISBN: - 9780262028264
- 658.877 23 Sa161
| Item type | Current library | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Books | ISI Library, Kolkata | 658.877 Sa161 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 137437 |
Browsing ISI Library, Kolkata shelves Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
|
No cover image available | No cover image available |
|
No cover image available |
|
|
||
| 658.872 M829 Search engine marketing Inc. | 658.873 B966 Expenses and profits of limited price variety stores in 1945, chains and independents | 658.873 F973 Buying by voluntary chains and other associations of retailers and wholesalers | 658.877 Sa161 Primer on auction design, management, and strategy / | 658.88 C912 Credit management handbook | 658.880151 B587 Credit risk: modeling, valuation and hedging | 658.880151 B658 Introduction to credit risk modeling |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Introduction --
2. Game theory, auction design, and strategy --
3. Revenue equivalence --
4. Optimal and VCG auctions --
5. Imperfect information and the winner's curse --
6. Sequential auctions of substitutes --
7. Sequential auctions of complements --
8. Single-product auctions --
9. Simultaneous auctions --
10. Combinatorial auctions --
11. Final remarks.
This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
There are no comments on this title.
